REFLECTIONS

Filling the Ranks

It is no news at all that – if we are to sustain a presence in Iraq sufficient (approximately 150-200 thousand troops) to carry through on the exceptional work being done there, reinforce and extend the NATO effort in Afghanistan, maintain a strategic reserve capable of intervening decisively in any other theatre of conflict that might emerge – and fulfill these requirements without exhausting the physical and spiritual resources of our serving men and women – the overall size of our ground-forces – Army and Marines – will  need to be expanded.

And, as should also be apparent to any who gives this matter due reflection, expansion of our ground forces cannot be performed too quickly without threatening a significant reduction in the overall quality of those forces. I.e. depreciation resulting from shortcuts and improvisations affecting: the sifting process required to ensure the suitability of the human material going into the system, the intensity and thoroughness of their training, the processes that serve to insure the quality and  availability of their equipment, and those processes that serve to similarly maintain  the infrastructure required to support and sustain any increase in the numbers  of active duty service personnel ( E.g. extra medics, chaplains, administrative personnel (military and civilian), MPs, etc, computers, buildings, duct tape, MREs, etc, and inclusive of housing, educational, medical and other support facilities for military families along with all the personnel required to staff them).

Naturally enough, when the quality of forces depreciate and shortages of equipment occur, it is safe to assume that casualties will increase as well, and that military operations may also stall or even fail as a consequence.

And, one is led to suspect that some who have called most insistently for a precipitously rapid expansion of the ground forces are also amongst those who would have inevitably cried the loudest in impugning incompetence and malfeasance to the military and civilian leadership required to implement those changes when the (also) inevitable shortcomings – including increased casualties and stalled operations – did emerge and “happened” to be “exposed” by the main-stream media. Inclinations towards a dynamic of that kind were evinced clearly enough in the atmosphere of “scandal” and self-righteous posturing displayed in some quarters in regards to the provision of armour  for American forces in the earlier stages of the counter-insurgency effort (here: for a prime example of the kinds of politicization of that issue that was pervasive at that time – some of the participants in which goings- on also being among those responsible for the neglect that affected America’s military infrastructure in general during the decade of the 1990s – and for which the American public has – so far – inexplicably, failed to hold them accountable).

And, in fact, it is likely enough that concerns over the possibility for depreciation of the quality of our ground forces resulting from a precipitously rapid increase in its size, as well as the consequent opportunities that condition would provide for the Islamists and their Marxist allies to try and undermine the war effort in Iraq and here at home, that prompted the former Sec of Defence to be wary of any such measures, hence to oppose them – and to do so to some excess.

In light of the considerations listed above it would seem that the intention expressed by the president and Sec Gates back in January – of increasing the ground forces – Army and Marine, Guard and Reserves -  generally – seemed to set a reasonable and responsible tone. Adding approximately 100,000 soldiers and Marines over a period of 5 years seems like an eminently worthwhile and obtainable goal. However, given the volatility of the American political scene concerning the war – including the continuing efforts of the Islamist influenced and Marxist led elements of the American political spectrum to disrupt recruiting efforts and induce servicing men and woman towards desertion, the possibilities existing for the extension of the conflict into other regions, and the possibility of a need for the expansion of our existing efforts in other areas – such as Afghanistan or the Horn of Africa, it also seems likely  that – additional forces might also be needed  – either as a permanent augmentation to the units that are being organized as part of the current expansion, and/or as a stop-gap as other units are being made ready.

In either case – particularly the latter – the rapidity with which such units might be organized and deployed as effective elements of our expeditionary forces – could be an important factor in their usefulness. Certainly, the quicker the better – all other things being equal.

With these factors in mind, though with some perspectives that have changed in the meanwhile, the following passage was included as a footnote in an article posted on this website previously  – Withdrawal  - where the idea was advanced that -

Perhaps as a stop-gap, some considerationsn might be given to the idea of recruiting former members of the armed forces of friendly nations – particularly those from NATO countries. Though the cultures of many of those nations may be limpid, there are many fine soldiers amongst their members. Many of whom may be more than willing to put their skill to good use in this struggle. Those from said countries will also come with an already existing knowledge of common equipment, nomenclature, and doctrine. Many will speak English as well.

Said idea originated – to my knowledge – in its  current form, and in regards to the War on Islamist Aggression – with Max Boot and Michael O’ Hanlon, who expounded it in their article -
- Create a U.S. foreign legion
which was printed in the Armed Forces Journal.
The topic was then taken up – with gusto – in the  Small Wars Journal, where it was debated at length. In both forums the discussion touched on the idea that troops recruited by such means may have some equivalence to the German mercenaries – i.e. “Hessians” – employed by the British during the
American War for Independence. Some commentators also expressed dismay and distaste at the ideas that America might “out-source” its military and employ foreigners to fight wars its own citizens are not sufficiently motivated to engage in personally.

I believe though that sound replies can be made to these kinds of objections. First, common sense methods can be employed to mitigate the chances that pecuniary considerations are the sole reason for enlistment. For example – if a program of that kind were to focus on recruiting former serving men and women from NATO countries – particularly those from Western Europe – it could go far to reduce the chances that shear poverty, lack of a social safety net, or even a desire for significant economic advancement were at the core of the reasons potential recruits might have for enlistment. Pay and benefits for American military personnel are not princely in comparison to mid-level jobs in the private sector of most Western European countries, where they already have state-controlled or subsidized health-care that one doesn’t need to get shot at in order to qualify for. Some  of which nations, such as Germany, also provide free access to post-secondary education as well. And, while there certainly is more economic opportunity in the states, the odds are that a bright person with initiative and drive – i.e. the very kind best suited for the American military – can still find there way “up the ladder” in places such as the Netherlands, Scandinavia, Germany and the UK, and, yes, even France – where the prospects are better now under a leadership that is not congenitally allergic to concepts such as “wealth”, “free-markets” and “growth” – and do so -  again -  with a much reduced chance of being killed or maimed-for-life in the next 4 years or so.  And, simple , standard economic background checks can further reduce the chances of recruiting those who are – literally – mercenaries – in spirit – hiring out for economic security or advancement alone. Other forms of screening – not so different from those undertaken normally in regards to certain levels of security clearance, but inclusive of additional areas of inquiry made relevant and necessary by the current struggle against Islamist aggression -  might also help to evaluate candidates for their attitudes towards Western culture and institutions, in general, and those of the US in particular, as well as for any ties or connections to Islamist or other rejectionist ideologies that see Islamists as real or potential allies – such as those espoused by various Marxist and neo-Nazi groups. Investigations of that kind and scope would then allow for positive weight to be given to factors that may indicate a candidate’s desire to enlist based on the presence of values, ideals and aspirations genuinely shared in common between them and their American-born counterparts, in addition to purely economic motives – and to do so while helping to guard against the enlistment of enemy operatives or sympathizers.

In a better world statements similar to those like “”our own people should be waging our own wars,” should have more practical import than they actually have. Unfortunately, too many elements of western-style democracies have been infected with cultural self-loathing along a breath-taking depth  of ignorance concerning everything from the comparative nature and value of their own history and heritage in relation to that of the world as a whole, to an equally  perplexing absence of the most basic knowledge of the methods, systems and principles that put the food on their tables, and the roofs over their heads every day. Otherwise “well educated” persons have been portrayed as willing to  forgo dessert or the purchase the usual number of toys for  the holidays under the influence of a sincere conviction that – if they consumed less chocolate and made some other reductions in demands made upon the worlds resources, otherwise impoverished people of the world would – somehow – have more, rather than less – chance of climbing out of poverty.  It’s as if one thought one could do their neighbours – shop-keepers – a favour by reducing the volume of purchases made at their establishment. It is “magical thinking” at its most destructive. In addition, the very virtues required to make good soldiers, sailors and airmen – love of country, competitive spirit, aggressiveness, willingness to give and take hard hits – verbal as well as physical, love of excellence and the ability to know it when encountered – and to recognize when it is lacking -  have been under siege in this country for several decades at the very least – supplanted by open-ended tolerance – of everything non-western and un Judaic-Christian, moral relativism, multiculturalism, and so on.

And in any case – even under better circumstances – “Small wars” – many  not so small in fact – such as the current struggle against the insurgency in Iraq – involve many facets that are difficult and distasteful even to many who might volunteer for service in more conventional conflicts. Hence, even then the chances are good that – depending on the length of the conflict, its intensity and the size of the forces involved on both sides. any force reliant solely on volunteers will run the risk of encountering challenges to its ability to maintain adequate force-levels at various points during the  effort.

And it is under the weight of the aforementiond circumstances that the currant administration, or any that follow, will have to fight and prevail in wars very similar to that now in progress in Iraq. They may be able to do many things worse or better than the way they are being done now or have been in the recent past, but it is unlikably that they will be able – or willing – to change the culture suffucently – and/or quickly enough – for our nation and its liberties to survive the currant conflict with the forced of Islamist aggression, without recourse to measures that would not have to be considered under other – better – circumstances.

And ii is in those terms – and in that context – rather than that of some idealize set of conditions that the possibility of recruiting foreign soldiers must be understood and considered.

(C) David Aronin 2007